motor yacht yogi sinking

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What Sank the Superyacht Yogi?

• By Kim Kavin
• Updated: March 25, 2013

yogi-running2-high-res-fin.jpg

In February 2012, the yachting industry was shocked to learn that the acclaimed 197-foot Proteksan-Turquoise Yogi had sunk in the Aegean Sea. She was barely a year old and still collecting awards for her design and craftsmanship, and then suddenly, she was gone.

Now, about a year later, the French Bureau d’Enquêtes sur les Évènements de Mer—also known as BEAmer—has released its 40-page report about the sinking. The report concludes that three aft compartments aboard Yogi flooded, causing the vessel to become unstable and sink. However, the report fails to pinpoint a cause of the flooding.

The report does hint at a possible problem with Yogi ‘s stern door, noting that the door seal had been replaced to make it “a more appropriate color.” Other work in that section of the yacht had included removing and re-installing the stern door to refit chests that held the swim ladders.

The report also states that originally requested warranty work had included addressing crew complaints about overall instability when Yogi was at sea, and that Yogi had a different superstructure than her sisterships, one that raised her center of gravity. The report’s conclusions urge naval architects and designers to “ban architectural options that pose risks for vessel safety,” but stop short of calling Yogi an unstable design.

Following the release of the BEAmer report, Mehmet Karabeyoglu, managing director at Proteksan-Turquoise, issued a statement that affirms the report’s conclusion that the shipyard adhered to all rules and regulations during the construction process. However, he criticized the report as “a limp effort” that contained factual inaccuracies. In particular, he noted that Yogi ‘s owner did originally request a new stability-related test, but then withdrew that request, leaving the yard to assume that everything was fine when the yacht was at sea.

“We can only conclude that stability was not an issue, otherwise the captain would not have sailed for months if he had doubts about stability and certainly would not have sailed into poor weather,” Karabeyoglu stated.

The upshot is that finger-pointing and backroom whispers about what sank Yogi is likely to continue for years to come. The yacht remains about 1,600 feet underwater off the coast of Skyros, Greece.

Click here to view photos of Yogi ‘s tragic end.

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The sinking of superyacht Yogi

A multi-million superyacht lies at the bottom of the Aegean Sea

In February 2012 a virtually new, $39 million megayacht sank in the Aegean Sea.

Only the eight members of the crew were onboard, and they were airlifted to safety.

Yogi was a 60m Turkish-build superyacht. Completed in 2011 at the Proteksan Turquoise yard, the yacht had serene interiors, accommodations of a world-class resort and the technological sophistication of modern vessel.

In the morning of the disaster, she was sailing in wintery conditions from Turkey to France. She made a visit to Turkey for a warranty paint period and now was heading to Cannes. She cleared the Dardanelles straight in the evening of February 16th and soldiered on despite the weather that took a turn for the worse.

Nobody knows what really happened in that grim night. A mayday call was issued at 03:30 hours. She sank at 08:45 in the morning of February 17th, just 19 nautical miles of the Greek island of Skiros.

The eight French members of the crew were picked up by a helicopter from the Hellenic Air Forces.

Super Puma Διάσωση "Yogi"/ SAR "Yogi" from Hellenic Air Force on Vimeo .

M/Y Yogi was sailing under the French flag. The yacht was owned by Stephane Courbit, a wealthy Frenchman.

The cause of the sinking is still unclear. The initial reports said that engine failure while navigating 3m waves was to blame for the sinking. The enquiry results were never published, the owner, the crew, the insurer, all hiring big legal teams to defend them. All the affair was surrounded in an official silence.

M/Y Yogi featured accommodation for 12 guests in six double cabins including a large main deck master suite with lounge and day area. On the features list there was a large jacuzzi on the sun deck, a swimming pool, two beach clubs, a massage room and many more.

Photo credits: EPA, AP, Boat International, Hellenic Air Force.

Yogi sinking dissected but not proved

A year after the sinking of M/Y Yogi, a new 198-foot (60m) yacht built by Proteksan-Turquoise in Turkey, French investigators have released the report into what happened.

The report by the Bureau d’enquetes sur les evenements de mer (the French Marine Accident Investigation Office, known as BEAmer), carries this caveat: “The analysis of this incident has not been carried out in order to determine or apportion criminal responsibility nor to assess individual or collective liability. Its sole purpose is to identify relevant safety issues and thereby prevent similar accidents in the future.”

Statements from the owner, the shipyard, the classification society, and the flag state authority (France) indicate that the vessel was technically sound and complied with the requirements of the French administration, the report notes.

Still, it sank.

In the early hours of Feb. 17, 2012, M/Y Yogi sank off Skyros Island in the Aegean Sea while en route from Istanbul to Cannes. Its eight crew were rescued. According to the report, here’s what happened:

On Feb. 15, 2012, Yogi sailed from Tuzla, Turkey, to Istanbul for bunkering. As the vessel was not fitted with a stability analysis software, the master carried out the stability calculations on paper. To lighten the vessel and to keep a level trim, the swimming pool tanks were emptied and the DO tanks were left empty, according to Proteksan Turquoise shipyard instructions.

On Feb. 16, the master’s report indicated weather conditions as follows: wind NNW 5-6 with 35-knot gusts. Swell 2-2.50m. Météo France reported wind NE 10-15 knots then NNE 25 knots (30- to 35-knot gusts). Significant wave height between 0.7-1m, sea state slight, then moderate in the western and southwestern part of the basin, reaching 1.3-1.5m after 8 p.m. around Skyros. About 3 a.m., end of the customs inspection and beginning of bunkering (25,000 liters). At 6:15 a.m., getting under way bound to Cannes. At 6:30 p.m., out of Dardanelles straits, pilot dropped. The autopilot setting was 5 degrees maximum rudder angle.The engines were running at 60 percent of the maximum load.

On Feb. 17, about 1:40 a.m., the chief engineer on watch (Chief M1) observed that the starboard engine exhaust expansion ring was split and leaking. As the phone was out of order, he tried to inform the bridge with the interphone but this was defective as well. Chief M1 went up to the bridge and asked the master to stop the starboard engine (there had been no high temperature alarm). At this moment, Chief M2, arrived on the bridge. He closed the two starboard engine exhaust hull valves. At 1:46 a.m., failure confirmation e-mail sent to DPA. The starboard engine was out of service. Soon after, the port engine exhaust and coolant freshwater temperature were also abnormally high. Chief M1 asked the master to slow down; at the same instant the engine automatically shut down. Yogi was stopped and making no way. Starboard broadside to the waves, she was rolling and listing to port. At 2 a.m., the DPA was informed of the second engine failure. The three engineers (the Master Mechanics had also been woken up) undertook the survey of the two seawater suction strainer and of the two engine cooling circuit strainers. The baskets were clean, but it seemed to the engineers that they were frame fit in the chamber without enough clearance and thus the inlet rate of seawater flow was insufficient. The chambers were put back without the baskets, the seawater cross-pipe was bled and the circuit was placed back in service. The service pump circuit (which was feeding the generators) had been set on the propeller shaft stuffing box (max. temp. 35°C, normally cooled by the main engine seawater cooling circuit); but soon after the generators’ coolant pressure was insufficient: back to initial set-up. At 2:20 am, pan-pan alert. About 2:30 a.m., the port engine was restarted and temperatures were back to normal. Chief M2 came to the bridge. When the master clutched in he observed that there was no answer to the helm: the autopilot was off and the two steering engines were “out of order”. The alarm lamps were on and a 30-degree angle to starboard was displayed on the helm angle repeater. In addition he did not succeed in starting the bow thruster. The engineers consider to seal the leak on the starboard exhaust with a thermal blanket (back-up generator insulation) and ratchet straps. Chief M1 and the master mechanics went then aft (without handheld VHF) for a first investigation in the steering room, through the companion hatch on the starboard side of beach club 2: about 15cm of water flooded beach club 2. When they opened the hatch, they observed that the steering room was also partially flooded (30-40cm) without any flooding detection alarm actuation. As the companion hatch was opened, the water was running down from beach club 2 to the steering room and the alarm set off. Chief M1 went back to the engine room and started to pump. The watertight door to access the hi-fog room was then closed by an engineer. The master mechanics went up to the bridge to report to the master and the first officer. The first officer accompanied by the master mechanics (also without hand-held VHF) went to inspect beach club 1 using the outside starboard staircase; taking advantage of a lurch to port, he opened the watertight door, and observed about 1m of water. In order to keep off a route broadside-on to the waves, the engine was kept running dead slow, despite the unavailable helm.

Soon after, the first officer and the master mechanics carried on a second investigation in beach club 1, after they had put on their survival suits. It appeared that the height of water was the same. Due to the tacking, the list shifted to starboard and increased suddenly. Water from the sewage tank flooded the engine room. At 3:25 a.m., DPA in contact with a company in Athens to charter a salvage tug. At 3:40 a.m., the hi-fog room located aft of the engine room was flooded. The draining pumps ran dry. At 3:45 a.m., the Lloyd open form contract was confirmed and the salvage tug went under way. At 4:28 a.m., mayday issued. At 4:40 a.m., last SAT C communication between the vessel and the DPA. About 6 a.m., the crew attempted to reach the liferafts, located on the aft of the sundeck, through the lounge but the two glass windows were blocked closed by the list. The crew did not succeed to break them. The crew found refuge in the superstructure. At 6:43 a.m., the first helicopter cancelled its mission due to a technical failure. At 6:47 a.m., last mobile phone communication between the master and the DPA. At 7:45 a.m., the second helicopter was on task. During the following minutes the stewardess and the rating were winched from the superstructure. Two life rafts were released. As the weather conditions were deteriorating (snow and hail), winching was considered too dangerous. The six other crew members jumped in the water, one after the other, to be winched up. At 8:50 a.m., all crew were in the helicopter bound to Skyros. At 11:04 a.m., the 406 MHz beacon ceased to transmit. Position 38°35.4 N – 025°03.7 E.

Yogi was the third of a three-vessel class built by Proteksan Turquoise shipyard. It was 6.4m longer and differed from the other yachts by a covered sun deck and a hard top. That’s the reason why a 27.9-metric-ton additional keel had been welded to the keel during the build, the report stated. The hull was made of steel and the superstructure of aluminium.

The vessel had two wide access shell doors at the level of the lower deck. The side door on starboard allowed pleasure boat movements from beach club 2. The stern door was used to store two retractable swim ladders. It was accessible from beach club 1. Both doors opened downward and outward. Fitted with joints, they were watertight and weathertight. The locking was done by eight hydraulic jacks fastened on the hull. When closing, if the male part of the jack was not perfectly fit in the door, the locking was impeded and an alarm went off.

Intact stability had been analyzed. An inclining experiment was done on March 17, 2011, in the presence of the local representative of the classification society, who was also the representative of the flag state authority. Damage stability was subjected to several propositions, which were linked to the definition of the watertight compartments proposed by the owner and for which the classification society asked the flag state advice. Indeed, at first, compartment beach club 1 and beach club 2 constituted one compartment (no tightness between the 2 compartments). This arrangement was not compliant to the damage stability criteria.

Watertightness between these compartments had been restored by a watertight hinged door. The compartmentation as well as the watertight doors location was subjected to a new examination after which it had been asked: “Given the type of door fitted between compartment 1 (described as beach club 1) and compartment 2 (described as beach club 2), the damage stability analysis should consider the case when these two compartments are flooded. This door would have to remain closed when the vessel is under way.”

Damage stability had been analyzed. The watertight bulkheads of the vessel should be so arranged that minor hull damage that results in the free flooding of any one compartment will cause the vessel to float at a waterline which, at any point, is not less than 75mm below the weather deck, freeboard deck, or bulkhead deck if not concurrent.

Minor damage should be assumed to occur anywhere in the length of the vessel, but not on a watertight bulkhead.

However, the classification society took into account the flooding of only one beach club and not both. Two months after the delivery, Yogi had a technical call in June 2011 to sort out a problem on the air conditioning system and to repair damages caused by a leak of refrigerant. Some deficiencies noted on the stern door (technical or aesthetic) had been corrected: * repair of hydraulic and electric opening/closing circuits damaged by water infiltrations in the swim ladder stainless chest, and * replacement of the door seal (poorly bonded but tight) by a silicone seal with a more appropriate color. In addition, a 200-liter, two compartment with submersible pumps tank to collect the dripping from the beach clubs had been installed aft of the steering gear in compartment 03. The installation required the modification of the draining circuit. These important modifications, although they affect an installation located under the freeboard deck, do not appear on plans, and the ABS company and the French administration were not informed. The schematic diagram is not part of the approved drawing package. On master’s request (who took command in July 2011), double hose clamps had been fitted on the modified draining circuit connections.

Different works were scheduled during the warranty survey done at the shipyard from October 2011 to February 2012. The major works were to recoat the vessel and to take down the stern door in order to refit the swim ladders chests, and it was necessary to punch the two hinges. The electric connections, the hydraulic spools and the fastening had been renewed. Operations had been monitored by an expert, a naval architect, and tightness tests (passed although the lower part of the stern door had not been tested) had been conducted with fresh water at a pressure of three atmospheres. The tightness had then been checked by the crew during the voyage from Tuzla to Istanbul and from Istanbul to Dardanelles.

However, a projected work list to be done in the frame of the warranty visit shows a specific request linked to the vessel instability (new inclining experiment), problems of submersion of the freeboard marks for some particular loading cases and a request to study an additional VIP cabin.

Loss of stability led to sinking The foundering of the vessel can be explained only by a fast deterioration of the stability, due to a progressive flooding of the three compartments of the aft zone. The gas leak in the starboard engine due to the crazing then cracking of the expansion ring had been preceded by no alarm. BEAmer had been informed of a similar failure on M/Y Petara (the rubber expansion ring, which melted at near 600°C temperature, had been replaced by a metallic ring). As the engineers did not have time to make a temporary repair, the starboard engine was not restarted. The increase of the temperature of the cooling freshwater and of the exhaust in the port engine did not lead to an immediately observable failure of the exhaust expansion ring. The engine shut down automatically, before the master had reduced speed. The engine had been restarted once the cooling seawater circuit had been reset.

The engines were set at 60 percent of maximum load. The sea state and vessel motions did not require to reduce speed. BEAmer does not consider the hypothesis of an air-blocked seawater circuit due to the vessel pitching and rolling. On the other hand, BEAmer considers the hypothesis of an insufficient cooling seawater flow rate, due to strainer basket frame fit in the chamber without enough clearance as an underlying factor contributing to put the vessel in jeopardy. Proteksan Turquoise objects to this hypothesis. (See the builder’s response to this report on page B13.) The cooling temperature thresholds had been exceeded, without the telemonitoring device had allowed the officer to anticipate an “auto shutdown” of the port engine and a major failure of the starboard engine. This malfunction is also an underlying factor.

The changes made to the superstructures led to a raise of the center of gravity. The additional keel do not appear on the as-built plans nor on the free-board report transmitted to the administration. Generally speaking, due to the absence of draught marks (to check the trim and the actual gross weight of the vessel), the stability calculations done on board lacked of precision.

Results of the Feb. 17 loading case calculations show figures hardly at the limits of the required criteria. The intact stability of the yacht appeared inadequate to the crew when the vessel was at sea: even when the wind was moderate the list taken by the vessel was noticeable. When the master wrote the projected work list to be done in the frame of the warranty visit, he requested other inclining experiment in order to check the figures. This request had been rejected by Proteskan Turquoise project manager and suppressed from the final list of works to be done.

This intact stability situation is an underlying factor and points out vulnerability of the vessel. The damage stability analysis has been impaired by a CNSNP advice that was not acted upon, which precised that the analysis should take in consideration the case when both beach clubs would be simultaneously flooded. On the other hand, it is probable that criteria would not have been met if this analysis had considered this requirement. This had been confirmed by the inability of the vessel to right up after the list to starboard had increased.

Considering the presence of 10cm (up to 30cm or more) of water in each of the beach clubs, it appears that the vessel could not right herself. This small reserve stability had been an aggravating factor of the flooding of contiguous compartments. It had led to the foundering of the vessel when the vessel superstructure flooding spots (engine room and crew dinning room air inlets) had been submerged, when the list had been reaching about 40 degrees.

In addition, BEAmer notices that “minor breach” notion puts the vessel survival capacity at risk. The definition should comprehend the entirety of a hull division between two watertight bulkheads and not be limited to one compartment. The side doors located under the level of the free-board deck have to be watertight. The sill of the side doors was under the waterline yet the detailed plans show that the door internal lower sills, protected by a seal, were above the deep waterline (DWL).

However BEAmer observes that International Convention on Load Lines (LL66, 1988 protocol) is not referred in division 242 although it seems particularly relevant in the case of big size side doors opening to watertight compartments. Although it was not part of the planned warranty work list, the disassembly of the stern door had been difficult. These difficulties resulted in meticulous watertightness control, both in the shipyard and at sea. To remain undetected, a water leak should have begun only shortly before the engine failure, with an important flow rate. Moreover, when the height of water is higher than several dozens of centimeters, its origin cannot be identified anymore.

A tightness failure of the stern door seal is the first hypothetical factor of the flooding of Yogi.

The officers on watch had never been alerted by the flooding alarm of the steering room. Given the vessel motions and the height of water observed during the investigation, it should have gone off. This malfunction is the second hypothetical factor contributing to the flooding. The modified draining circuit of the three aft compartments constitutes a “weak link” that could have initiated the spreading of water from one compartment to the two others, through a siphon effect in case of an overflowing of the drips tank, and following the flooding of beach club 1. This malfunction constitutes a third hypothetical factor.

BEAmer observed that the crisis had been managed without unnecessary risk-taking and with cold-blood by the crew, under the master’s authority.

A response issued by Mehmet Karabeyoglu, managing director of Proteksan-Turquoise , available here.

Full report available by clicking here . French and English are in same document.

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Head of Proteksan Turquoise comments on sinking of superyacht Yogi

Following yesterday's news about the sinking of the 60.2m (198ft) Yogi off the coast of Greece , we have an exclusive interview with Mehmet Karabeyoglu, head of Proteksan Turquoise, the yacht's builder, who was understandably distraught over the incident.

Yogi was en route from Turkey where she had finished a warranty paint period, to her berth in the Med. All eight French crew aboard were rescued by the Hellenic Air Force. Capt. Jean Louis Carrel told Greek authorities that although the weather was rough, he believed the sinking was a result of a mechanical failure with the exhaust system.

Karabeyoglu comments, “What I find surprising is that the first mayday call to the boat sinking was nearly seven hours.  They had power as you can see lights on .”

“What we can see is that she survived seven hours without turning over. So this is enough reason for us to believe she could have been saved – although we are not blaming anyone. There was a Force 8 so the weather made things difficult, but she did not sink due to the weather,” he said.

Helenic rescue video of superyacht Yogi sinking

Responding to our question about an exhaust system accident and loss of engine power reported by the crew, Karabeyoglu comments, “They have said it was mechanical failure, that one engine overheated, and broke the exhaust bellows – but there’s a valve underneath it.”

The Hellenic rescue video shows the Yogi crew appropriately mustered on deck next to the wheelhouse wearing their bright red their survival suits when the rescue helicopter approached. A large life raft was deployed and crew clambered down the port side of the heavily listing yacht to the raft where they were rescued by the military swimmers.

Says Karabeyoglu, “At first we thought all these things happened fairly quickly. But the mayday was 00:30, and the rescue happened at 07:30.”

“My partner has spoken to the owner. He is obviously not happy, he loved the boat. She was just repainted, but we did no work in the engine room as it was perfect. No mechanical work other than routine service of the Cat engines. Perhaps they took bad fuel when they refueled in Istanbul.”

“It’s the first time has happened for us, so we not sure what happens next,’ said Karabeyoglu. ‘We have sent people to Athens who will meet with the crew and interview them; we’re doing everything we can to understand what happened. There will be the testimony of crew and the video. You can see water coming out of the side and power on the vessel so the generators were running – you can tell many things, so the engine room was not flooded. You can see exhaust coming from the hull side so one of engine room generators was running.”

Karabeyoglu also told us that in addition to being able to use the engines to pump water out, there were three bilge pumps, one more than class required. The yacht had three generators plus the emergency generator.

Yogi registered 1028 GT and was built to ABS +A1, +AMS and was classed as Commercial Yachting Service (E). Her stunning profile and interior was designed by Jean Guy Verges, who has designed six other builds by the yard. Yogi was the second of three large yachts delivered by Proteksan in 2011.

John Wickham, who issued a statement on behalf of the builder, said that the yard is actively investigating the incident and will release details as available.

Boat International sources learned yesterday that a purchase offer had been made via Camper & Nicholsons just days before the accident and had been expected to be presented to the owner.

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By SuperyachtNews 21 Feb 2013

BEAmer report into 'Yogi' sinking published

Beamer has published the results of its investigation into the sinking of 'yogi'. the report outlines recommendations for owners, builders class societies and flag states, in light of its research.….

“The report fails to add any constructive value [to the situation] because it focuses on criticising general rules and design issues that the whole world builds to." - Mehmet Karabeyoglu

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Yacht Yogi sinks

Discussion in ' Stability ' started by michael pierzga , Feb 17, 2012 .

Pascal Warin Junior Member

michael pierzga said: ↑ Ah Yes...I miss read...... When calculating Yogi s stabilty are tanks like the 10 ton swimming pool water tanks aft considered to be full or empty ? Click to expand...

michael pierzga Senior Member

When considering stabilty what is the definition of SUPERSTRUCTRE ?  

michael pierzga said: ↑ When considering stabilty what is the definition of SUPERSTRUCTRE ? Click to expand...

I find motoryacht design confusing. This motoryacht pictured suntanning on the beach .... Is the superstructure everything above the stern passerelle ?  

Attached Files:

daiquiri Engineering and Design

Believe it or not : there is no weather criterion for this kind of motor yacht !!  

Alik Senior Member

http://www.boatinternational.com/20...uoise-comments-on-sinking-of-superyacht-yogi/ "Her stunning profile and interior was designed by Jean Guy Verges" OK, this is what happens once stylist draws the windows close to WL.  

Pascal Warin said: ↑ Believe it or not : there is no weather criterion for this kind of motor yacht !! Click to expand...

No there is not. MSN 1792 (M) - The Large Commercial Yacht Code (LY2) - 11.2.1.1 Monohull Vessels French reg. Division 240 is copy/paste of that.  

Alik said: ↑ OK, this is what happens once stylist draws the windows close to WL. Click to expand...

How is a yacht like Yogi designed ? A team of unknown naval architects design a " platform" then a stylist adapts this platform to the clients fantasy ?  

Pascal Warin said: ↑ No there is not. MSN 1792 (M) - The Large Commercial Yacht Code (LY2) - 11.2.1.1 Monohull Vessels French reg. Division 240 is copy/paste of that. Click to expand...

michael pierzga said: ↑ How is a yacht like Yogi designed ? A team of unknown naval architects design a " platform" then a stylist adapts this platform to the clients fantasy ? Click to expand...

Alik said: ↑ OK agree on LY2; But for example BV has it. See Part B #3.2. In DNV Rules for Special Craft, Yachts are required to comply with main class requirements of stability, this means weather criterion is also applied. LR SSC applies weather criterion to yachts, see P4 Ch.2 #8.6. If the boat was under ABS, they do not have stability requirements in Motor Pleasure Yachts. Click to expand...

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Pascal Warin said: ↑ You are right on every points but problem is that flag requirements takes precedence on class ones. Specially as owner wants the minimum "trouble". As you know for some owners safety means "trouble". Click to expand...

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